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Most Eurasian countries’ political systems are not accurately described as some version of
either democracy or authoritarianism. Nor does it advance social science to study each of
these countries’ political systems as being completely unique, sharing no signiﬁcant
commonalities with those of other countries. Instead, it is more fruitful to understand
many Eurasian countries as a type of hybrid regime, a system that combines important
elements of both democracy and autocracy in some way. One of the most important
features of Eurasia’s hybrid regimes, one that is shared by many hybrid regimes world-
wide, is that they combine contested elections with pervasive political clientelism. Political
developments in these countries can thus be usefully understood as machine politics, and
the development of political systems can be understood as processes of rearranging the
components of the machines in different ways. The usefulness of this approach is
demonstrated through an in-depth study of the Russian Federation. It is argued that
Russian political development under Putin is best understood not as ‘‘authoritarianization’’
but as a process in which Russia transitioned from a system of ‘‘competing pyramids’’ of
machine power to a ‘‘single-pyramid’’ system, a system dominated by one large political
machine. It turns out that in single-pyramid systems that preserve contested elections, as
does Russia, public opinion matters more than in typical authoritarian regimes.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.How can we best understand political developments in
post-Soviet Eurasia? Three traditional lenses are frequently
invoked. One is the narrow country studies approach. This
approach focuses only on one individual country’s dynamics
without relating them to any other country, without
attempting to draw any conclusions that could be useful for
a comparative understandingof other countries, andwithout
drawing on the collectivewisdomof comparative research to
gain insight into what is happening in this country.1 While
studying a country like Russia or Kazakhstan alone isworks, see Gel’man
Research Center, Hanyang Univercertainly worthwhile, this is an underachieving approach
from the perspective of social science because it does not
contribute as much as it could to the central social scientiﬁc
goal of building cumulative knowledge through theory.
The second traditional lens is the democracy perspec-
tive: When the USSR ﬁrst broke apart, most Eurasian states
except Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were assumed to be
‘‘young’’ democracies and the driving forces of political
system change were assumed to be such factors as public
opinion, political party strategy, electoral institutions, and
incumbent authorities’ ability tomanipulate these elements
as is typically done in democracies.2 These topics still
structuremanyof the best textbooks onEurasian countries.32 Bunce (1995); Colton (1992); Fish (1995); Huntington (1991); Karl &
Schmitter (1991); McFaul (2001); O’Donnell (1993). More recently, see
Shleifer and Treisman (2004).
3 E.g., Hesli (2007); Remington (2010); Sakwa (2008); White, Sakwa
and Hale (2010).
sity. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer review under
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standing of Russia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and other Eurasian
countries in the same terms we use for Western European
polities – was never an ideal ﬁt with these countries and in
most cases (led by Russia) the ﬁt seems to be growing
worse.4
A third approach, increasingly popular among Western
specialists on Eurasia as well as a subset of Eurasian
analysts themselves, goes to the opposite extreme and
treats Russia and its Eurasian neighbors as autocracies in
the mold of Franco’s Spain or Amin’s Uganda.5 Factors like
public opinion and elections are ruled out as driving forces
behind political developments, with most explanations of
these developments focusing on the personal interests of
the ‘‘dictator’’ and the mechanisms of monitoring and
punishment that the dictator uses to prevent meaningful
political challenges. Some scholars do allow a role for
public opinion, but in the form of what they sometimes call
Russia’s authoritarian political culture.6 While this
approach does provide a simple explanation for the
contraction of contested political space in Russia and most
other countries of Eurasia during 2000–2008, it is quite at
odds with other ways in which most of today’s Eurasian
countries differ quite dramatically from 1960s Spain and
1970s Uganda, not to mention the Brezhnevite USSR or
even today’s Uzbekistan. While some would treat Eurasian
countries as being in ‘‘transition’’ to democracy or autoc-
racy, this is also unsatisfactory: Indeed, most political
systems of the post-Soviet space have remained something
other than pure democracy or pure dictatorship for the
entire period since their independence (Carothers, 2002).
In the pages that follow, I propose that the comparative
social science analysis of countries with political systems
like Russia’s – whose system has beenwidely emulated and
even propagated in Eurasia – will be most fruitful by
treating its political system not as sui generis but also as
neither democracy nor autocracy. Instead, it is helpful to
think of Russia and many other Eurasian countries as one
type of hybrid regime. A hybrid regime is a political system
that combines some democratic and some autocratic
elements in signiﬁcant measure. It is not, however, a mere
half-way category: hybrid regimes have their own distinct
dynamics that do not simply amount to half of what we
would see in a democracy plus half of what wewould see in
an autocracy. And such systems are far from being unique
to Russia or even Eurasia. According to Freedom House
measures, about one-third of all of the world’s political
systems have beenwhat wemight call hybrid regimes ever
since the mid-1970s, when Freedom House began its well-
known global evaluations.7 The study of Russia, therefore,
can help us better understand these dynamics that are
relevant to other countries in Eurasia and the world. And
more general theories of hybrid regimes, it is argued, can4 Most of these textbooks have introduced some changes in later
editions to adapt to more recent developments, but the underlying
framework they adopt has remained essentially the same.
5 E.g., Fish (2001); Roeder (1994).
6 E.g., Pipes (2004).
7 Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ﬁw09/
FIW09_Tables&GraphsForWeb.pdf, access date April 20, 2009.help us better understand Russian developments under
Putin (and before him).1. The hybrid regime: a useful concept for
understanding Eurasian politics
There are many ways inwhich a regime can be ‘‘hybrid.’’
One way is exempliﬁed by South Africa under apartheid,
which featured free, fair, and highly competitive elections
but only among the minority white population. The
majority blacks were excluded entirely. To explain
outcomes within white community politics, then, one
needed the analytical tools of democracy. But to under-
stand the bigger picture, including how whites maintained
their dominance, one needed to understand the logic of
authoritarianism. Robert Dahl dubbed this form of hybrid
regime competitive hegemony (Dahl, 1971).
Russia is an example of a different kind of hybrid regime,
one that is far more common than competitive hegemony
and that – for convenience sake – we might refer to as an
electoral patronal system. First, the formal mechanism for
gaining, maintaining, and retaining the most powerful
posts in the country is regular elections. Second, real
opposition parties are allowed to exist and at least some of
them are permitted to compete in these elections. Third,
power in the regime is exercised primarily through
complex networks of patron–client relations (Afanasiev,
1997). That is, political transactions consist less of abstract
promises to support broad programmatic ideas than of
concrete promises of personal incentives and private
beneﬁts made to speciﬁc individuals (jobs, contingent
opportunities to gain private income, bribes, helpwith local
problems, assistance to relatives, etc.) as well as explicit or
implicit threats made to these same individuals (Kitschelt &
Wilkinson, 2007). In politics, these are themethods of what
is known in the West as ‘‘machine politics’’ and in Russia as
the ‘‘administrative resource’’ (administrativnyi resurs).
Political machines are typically dominated by a patron
(such as Yury Luzhkov in Moscow or Huey Long in the
American state of Louisiana in the 1930s) who sits atop
a ‘‘pyramid’’ of individuals and organizations and distrib-
utes resources and punishments to (based on systematic
monitoring of) those at lower levels of the pyramid.
A whole set of ‘‘subpatrons’’ control different parts of the
machine under the supervision of the patron (Medina &
Stokes, 2007). In Russian parlance, this is also widely
known as the ‘‘power vertical’’ (vertikal’ vlasti).
Political machines can provide real beneﬁts to their
constituents and even to the larger communities that they
dominate. For example, Huey Long’s political machine in
Louisiana mobilized a great deal of resources to build
universities and infrastructure in a previously underde-
veloped American state. But they also can be very coercive,
using corruption and pressure (along with inducements
like bribes) to remain in power and to get things done. To
borrow an image from sports, they strongly ‘‘tilt the playing
ﬁeld’’ to their advantage when it comes to elections and the
exercise of power, though they do not eliminate the contest
or destroy the ﬁeld altogether as a true dictatorship does
(Levitsky & Way, 2002).
8 Aleksandr Shmelev, in a roundtable discussion (Shmelev, 2007).
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the same country. A city-level political machine can
completely dominate the politics of its own city but be
in strong competition with a political machine of a rival
city. Political machines at the regional level can similarly be
in control of city-level machines in some cities but not in
other cities. And likewise, a political machine at the
national level might base its authority primarily on some
regional- or city-level political machines but not on others.
Moreover, regional-level political machines that are not
subordinated to the national machine can gang up to try to
oppose the national-level machine or rival alliances of
regional-level machines. Of course, territorially based
political machines are not the only form of patronal pyra-
mids: large corporations in collusionwith the state are also
a form of patronage pyramid that can be very important
in an electoral patronal system. This is especially true
where corporations control ‘‘company towns,’’ where large
shares of people are dependent on a single corporation
for their livelihoods and where the corporation can thus
easily inﬂuence political outcomes. In short, electoral
patronal politics can come in a wide variety of different
conﬁgurations.
What we have seen in Russia under Putin, it will be
argued below, can be understood as a transformation from
a ‘‘competing-pyramid’’ system where multiple regional
and corporate patronage pyramids actively competed for
support to a ‘‘single-pyramid’’ system where the president
has effectively combined the most important lower-level
patronal networks into one large nationwide political
machine. This is very different from saying that Russia has
become an authoritarian state since a political machine,
even a very large nationwide political machine, behaves in
ways that are quite distinct from authoritarianism so long
as it does not end elections in which at least some real
opposition is allowed to compete.
For one thing, electoral patronal systems force their
leaders to pay more attention to public opinion than pure
autocracies are usually expected to do. This is because the
mere fact of elections that include even just one real
opposition party or candidate make the machine vulner-
able to collapse if public opinion turns against it. Public
support is a resource that opposition politicians (those who
would create or expand alternative pyramids) can use to
bring people into the streets, to convince subpatrons that
the incumbent regime is doomed, to persuade troops that
they should not ﬁre on ‘‘the people,’’ or to generate such
overwhelming votes against the regime that falsiﬁcation
becomes impossible or so obvious and outrageous that
people will be willing to actively oppose it despite threats
of repression. As Tucker has also emphasized, elections in
such situations can solve important problems of both mass
and elite collective action that regime incumbents can
usually manipulate to prevent mass mobilization and
coordinated elite moves against the authorities (Tucker,
2007). It is for such reasons that the ‘‘color revolutions’’ all
took place in electoral patronal systems, in the wake of
elections, and among precisely the set of countries with the
least popular incumbent presidents (Hale, 2005; McFaul,
2005). And it is also for such reasons that Putin’s team has
paid such intense attention to monitoring and promotingits own public opinion ratings, a phenomenon that has led
Aleksandr Shmelev to call Putin’s Russia a ‘‘ratingocracy’’
(reitingokratiia).8 It is important to realize that this role for
public opinion (which primarily acts to strengthen or
weaken a political machine’s ability to manipulate electoral
outcomes and to ensure elite unity between elections) is
very different from that typical of democracies (where
shifts in public opinion regularly produce incumbent defeat
at the ballot box without any attendant strengthening or
weakening of the ability to manipulate, coerce, or defraud).
One reason why electoral patronal regimes like Russia’s
should be considered as a category distinct fromdemocracy
or dictatorship, therefore, is that public opinion plays
a distinct role in these systems.
There are at least two other important reasons for
treating them as a separate category, however. For one
thing, many of these systems are highly durable, which
discredits the notion that they should be treated merely as
transitory, as half-way houses on the road to democracy or
autocracy. Even a quick look at the political systems of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) makes this
clear. The vast majority of countries there have remained
far from purely democratic yet have still retained at least
some meaningful electoral contestation for a whole decade
or more in the post-Soviet period. Since even one decade is
quite a signiﬁcant period of time, it would-be unwise to
forego a full understanding of how regimes behave for such
a period even if they are all to later shift clearly either to
democracy or autocracy.
Moreover, there is strong empirical evidence that hybrid
regimes do not behave like democracies or autocracies in
terms of many different political outcomes. They do not
even behave like half-democracies or half-autocracies,
producing outcomes that are roughly in between those that
democracies would produce and those that autocracies
would produce. In fact, systematic comparative research
has found that hybrid regimes are more likely to go to war
than either democracies or autocracies (Mansﬁeld &
Snyder, 2005), are more prone to state failure than either
democracies or autocracies (Goldstone et al., 2000), and
have lower rates of business conﬁdence than in either
democracies or autocracies (Kenyon & Naoi, 2010). That is,
somehow being between democracy and autocracy is
associated with higher levels of certain economic, political,
and international problems rather than middle levels of
these problems. Much more research needs to be done to
determine if these relationships are more than coincidental
and if regime hybridity is indeed a cause rather than an
effect. But at a minimum, these ﬁndings provide important
cause to study hybrid regimes as potentially something
distinct.
2. Patronal Russia: from competing-pyramid to
single-pyramid system
While one might treat the 2000s in Russia as nothing
other than a period of autocratization, for the purposes of
comparative political analysis it might be more useful to
9 Afanasiev 1997.
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from a competing-pyramid to a single-pyramid hybrid
regime. Importantly, this implies that the 1990s should not
be considered a period of pure democracy in Russia. Indeed,
President Boris Yeltsin helped create the electoral patronal
system and even showed strong signs of wanting to turn it
into a single-pyramid version. Putin’s chief contribution
was to succeed where Yeltsin failed and then to take this
success further than Yeltsin most likely intended. Putin’s
success in this endeavor is partly due to his tougher lead-
ership, partly due to his greater popularity, and partly due
to a change in incumbent thinking that occurred through
historical contingency.
While some have interpreted the rise in authoritarian
tendencies under Putin as the ‘‘return of the past,’’ the
reappearance of the Soviet system, in fact it reﬂects
something new. There is relatively little direct continuity
between the old Soviet totalitarian system and the current
politics of the Putinite political machine. The perestroika-
era reforms and the aftermath of the August 1991 coup
attempt largely destroyed the sinews of the Soviet totali-
tarian system, including Communist Party rule and the
command economy. The regional party ‘‘prefects’’ (obkom
ﬁrst secretaries) lost their ability to control their regions as
the economic breakdown and reforms stripped them of
their power to make funding and supply decisions that
could make or break local enterprises and as local legisla-
tures were given power and ﬁlled by candidates who were
no longer dependent on the CPSU for their careers (Hale,
2003).
Under Yeltsin, three major reforms took place that
created the foundation for the electoral patronal system
that characterizes Russia today. First, the privatization
process and economic restructuring created a series of very
large corporate conglomerates that controlled vast
resources and organization and that also frequently inter-
vened in politics. The heads of these entities, branded
‘‘oligarchs’’ by their critics, sometimes controlled important
mass media outlets (including two of the nation’s three
major television channels, First Channel and NTV) and
depended heavily for their wealth on the beneﬁcence of
different parts of the state.
Second, under Yeltsin, newly elected regional leaders
were given a great deal of authority to restructure both
political institutions and the economic environment in
their provinces. The most innovative and proactive
among them used this authority not only to alter elec-
toral institutions in ways that reinforced their own
advantage, but also to dramatically shape the privatiza-
tion process locally. Through a variety of formal and
informal means, many were able to ensure that either
their own personal networks or regional governments
themselves owned or controlled enough of the provincial
economy (especially the most lucrative and political
potent assets) to effectively prevent them from being
used by political opponents. Where outright ownership
was not possible, regional leaders also developed a wide
range of levers by which they could pressure businesses
whose owners or managers (or even employees) might
be found supporting opposition forces. These levers
included everything from licensing authority to theability to ﬁne or suspend a company’s operations through
tax or ﬁre inspections.9
Third, Yeltsin himself forcibly converted Russia from
a parliamentary-presidential regime in which the Congress
of People’s Deputies ultimately had the greater legal
authority to a strongly presidential regime that was widely
dubbed ‘‘superpresidential.’’ The keymoment came in 1993,
when the President ordered tanks to ﬁre on the parliament
building, widely known as theWhite House, and then called
a snap referendum on a new constitution with minimal
parliamentary powers. The Duma was not completely
powerless, at least when controlled by an opposition party
as it was for part of Yeltsin’s presidency, but Yeltsin and his
associates quickly built a tremendous degree of informal
power around various presidential structures, especially the
Presidential Administration. The keymoment came in 1996,
when Yeltsin for the ﬁrst time vigorously applied various
sticks and carrots to mobilize regional political machines
and major ﬁnancial-industrial groups into nationwide
pyramid of patronage networks as a way of defeating his
Communist Party challenger, Gennady Zyuganov. Zyuganov,
initially far ahead inpublic opinionpolls, controlled his own
power pyramid, wielding support from a large number of
‘‘red governors’’ who proved unwilling to place their bets on
Yeltsin. Initially, Zyuganov even got donations from many
large corporations that hoped to hedge their bets and gain
favorable treatment should the Communist candidate win
(Kolmakov, 2003). Yeltsin’s pyramid provedmore powerful,
however, as the President used his formal and informal
presidential authority to provide important transfers of
resources to key regions, threaten the same regionswith the
denial of such funds should they not comply, and provide
corporate leaders with highly favorable privatization
opportunities in return for campaign ﬁnancing and biased
television coverage on the channels they controlled (John-
son, 2001; Treisman, 1997). The Communists, in control
only of a weak legislature at the national level, could not
effectively counter these strong presidential moves.
The mechanism that Yeltsin created and ﬁrst mobilized
to win reelection in 1996 was, at root, essentially the
same mechanism that Putin developed in the 2000s to
create the political system we have today. Putin’s main
political achievement in this regard was precisely to
develop this mechanism, greatly strengthening it and
shoring it up through a variety of changes in law and in
informal practice. The most important change he made
was in radically reducing the autonomy allowed to the
subpatrons in the system and thereby tying them more
tightly into the pyramid of power he established. So
successful had he become by the end of his second term,
that Russia had effectively turned into a single-pyramid
patronal regime, one almost entirely dominated by Putin
and his allies. To be sure, this did not mean that the
Kremlin effectively controlled Russia’s entire political
space, but it did mean that no other set of patrons could
pretend to anything close to rivaling the Kremlin’s
nationwide political machine.
11 Coalson, Robert. 2008. ‘‘NTV’s Past Points Toward REN-TV’s Future,’’
End Note, RFE/RL Newsline, March 4.
12 This particular ﬁgure comes from the 2008 Russian Election Study
survey of 1130 individuals across the Russian Federation conducted
during March–May 2008 by the Demoscope group at the Institute of
Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and organized by Timothy J.
Colton, Henry E. Hale, and Michael McFaul. Figure supplied by the survey
authors.
13 Woodruff, David. ‘‘Khodorkovsky’s Gamble: From Business to Politics
in the YUKOS Conﬂict,’’ PONARS Policy Memo no.308, November 2003,
https://gushare.georgetown.edu/eurasianstrategy/Memos/2003/pm_
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regional leaders. Putin began almost immediately after his
May 2000 inauguration, creating a set of seven federal
okrugs led by his appointed envoys. The envoyswere tasked
with reducing the ability of governors to ﬂout federal law
and to bend local branches of federal agencies to their own
will. By 2008, the center had largely eliminated regional
laws that contradicted federal law (which by one estimate
was close to one-third of all regional laws at the start of his
presidency) and reestablished a signiﬁcant degree of federal
control over local prosecutors, ministries, and courts in
most regions (Petrov, 2005; Reuters, 2000). Soon after-
wards, he stripped governors of their seats in the Federation
Council, replacing them with ﬁgures chosen through
a system of appointments in which the center wielded
signiﬁcant informal inﬂuence. This not only reduced the
degree of governors’ direct inﬂuence on federal politics as of
2001, but also denied them an important forum formeeting
directly with each other in large numbers and coordinating
their activities outside of central initiatives. As of July 2003,
another reform reduced the degree to which governors
could get their own people elected to regional legislatures:
At least one chamber of every region’s legislature had to ﬁll
at least half of its seats through a competition of nationally
registered parties’ lists. Now governors had to reach
agreement with a federal party to run their candidates
under its label or lose control of those seats in the legisla-
ture. The most dramatic move, however, came in the wake
of the 2004 Beslan tragedy, after which Putin eliminated
direct gubernatorial elections and replaced them with
a kind of appointment system. In the new system, the
president’s envoy nominates the candidate, who then must
be conﬁrmed by a majority vote in the regional legislature.
Partly because the center had made great headway in
creating large United Russia fractions in the legislatures
after the 2003 reform, no regional legislature has ever
rejected a nominee as of the time of this writing. In 2009,
the power to nominatewas granted to the party havingwon
the most votes in the most recent regional legislative
elections.
The result of all these reforms has been a radical
reduction in the degree to which governors, one of the
Yeltsin-era’s chief kinds of subpatron, could act autono-
mously to inﬂuence federal politics. One VTsIOM poll is
telling of their reduced prominence: As of July 2008, only
two governors were named bymore than 4% of the Russian
population as being best at solving key problems: Moscow
Mayor Yury Luzhkov and Kemerovo Governor Aman
Tuleev.10 By one count, all but one ‘‘red governor’’ by 2008
had been either replaced by more Kremlin-friendly indi-
viduals (for example, in Bryansk where the KPRF’s Yury
Lodkin was replaced by United Russia candidate Nikolai
Denin) or essentially converted into Kremlin loyalists (for
example, Vladimir’s Nikolai Vinogradov, who was ulti-
mately expelled by the KPRF). The lone KPRF holdout as of
early 2008 was Volgograd’s Yury Maksiuta (Kommersant-
Vlast, 2008). As a result, virtually all governors were now
ﬁrmly embedded in the Kremlin’s own power pyramid and10 Kommersant, July 24, 2008.had much less will and ability than before to join any
attempt to form a rival pyramid.
The other set of major subpatrons to be brought into line
much more strictly than before was big business, especially
the so-called ‘‘oligarchs’’ who could inﬂuence mass media
coverage of politics. The major moves took place in Putin’s
ﬁrst term. Initially, former Kremlin insider Boris Berezov-
sky, someone quite instrumental in Putin’s own rise to the
presidency, was effectively forced to give up key assets
(including control over the First Channel) and to leave the
country for fear of prosecution. The next business titan to
fall was Vladimir Gusinsky, who had largely opposed
Putin’s rise in 1999–2000 and who controlled the country’s
third-largest television channel, NTV. A variety of charges
led Gusinsky to ﬂee Russia, and the partially state-owned
Gazprom took control of NTV by calling in a debt granted in
the Yeltsin era that NTV was unable to pay off. Business
structures reputedly close to the Kremlin continued to
acquire media assets under Putin’s presidency far more
often than they gave them up, by 2008 even owning rela-
tively minor formerly independent outlets like REN-TV.11
While the press remained relatively free despite acquisi-
tions by reputedly Kremlin-connected businesses, surveys
have showed that as many as 89 percent of all Russian
citizens regard television as their primary source of polit-
ical information.12
Media were not the oligarchs’ only source of inﬂuence,
of course, and Kremlin forces accordingly took other steps
to ensure that business worked in concert toward the
national objectives set by the President. The most dramatic
move was the demonstrative October 2003 arrest of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, at the time Russia’s richest man and
owner of the Yukos corporate empire. While the Kremlin’s
charges of his corruption (as with the charges against
Berezovsky and Gusinsky) were credible, observers were
widely doubtful that Khodorkovsky and his circle were the
only guilty parties; those who acted in a more loyal fashion
were pointedly not facing such problems. In fact, the
Khodorkovsky arrest was preceded by a number of other
Kremlin moves designed both to cow and coordinate
businesses that could potentially become important
players in politics. In 2000, for example, Putin met with
business leaders and was widely believed to have promised
to leave them in control of their assets so long as they did
not operate against Kremlin wishes in politics. One theory
is that it was this ‘‘pact’’ that Khodorkovsky broke,
precipitating his arrest.13 The Kremlin worked not only to0308.pdf, access date August 12, 2009. Compare: Markov, Sergei. 2003.
‘‘The Yukos Affair and Putin’s 2nd Term,’’ The Moscow Times, July 29,
circulated on Johnson’s Russia List No.7269
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activity so that it was not divided among different Kremlin
loyalists competing for inﬂuence under Putin’s wing. Thus
in the run-up to the 2003 Duma election, the presidential
envoys in the federal districts were very active in
instructing business as to which pro-Kremlin candidates to
back in the single-member-district Duma elections in an
effort to avoid a split that could let an opposition candidate
win (Hale, 2006). The result, as is well known, was
a breakthrough election, as a result of which United Russia
was able to create the ﬁrst constitutional majority for
a single party in a Russian parliament since the Soviet era.
Similar efforts at the local level have produced United
Russia majorities in virtually all-provincial legislative
assemblies as of 2009.
Partly as a result of these actions and policies, business
has become generally unwilling (if not actually unable) to
back opposition parties without the OK of the Kremlin
(Morar’, 2007). Yabloko Party representatives, for example,
have claimed that Putin personally gave Khodorkovsky the
instruction to fund their party prior to the 2003 election,
and that their sources of ﬁnancing almost completely dried
up after the Yukos chairman’s arrest.14 Even the business-
friendly Union of Right Forces claimed to have nearly
completely lost its corporate donors after going into ‘‘hard
opposition’’ against the Kremlin in the 2007 Duma
campaign, a claim lent credence by a statement by Russian
Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists Vice President
Igor Yurgens that an SPS led by the ‘‘more agreement-
capable’’ Leonid Gozman would regain signiﬁcant
donations.15
The idea of the Kremlin using formal and informal
presidential power to coordinate business support for
electoral purposes originated in the Yeltsin era, therefore,
but the practices and policies of Putin and his allies have
exponentially augmented the potency of this mechanism.
Yeltsinwas able to mobilize forces in an emergencymanner
to eke out a victory against a Communist Party opponent in
1996 and by 1999–2000 was again able only to barely
defeat a challenge from a rival patronal pyramid, one led by
Luzhkov and former PrimeMinister Yevgeny Primakov that
had the support of many of the country’s most powerful
governors and representatives of business. Already by
2003–2004 and without question by 2007–2008, Putin had
effectively combined all major potential subpatrons into
a single political pyramid that was so tightly bound that
few even thought a serious challenge was possible.
Why was Putin so much more effective in turning Rus-
sia’s political system into something that might be
described as ‘‘one big political machine’’ than was Yeltsin?
One factor is probably political style. While a close exami-
nation of Yeltsin’s record belies any claim that he is a true
democrat, what we can say is that he was more tolerant of
media criticism and, signiﬁcantly, more inclined to trust in
his own ability to mobilize forces to achieve an improbable
victory against strong opponents than Putin has been.14 Interviews with Author.
15 Nikita Belykh, personal blog, http://belyh.ru, September 26, 2008,
access date September 27, 2008; Vedomosti, September 29, 2008.There is some evidence that Yeltsin even thrived personally
on pulling off such political victories (Colton, 2008). Thus
while he was quite authoritarian in some of his methods of
rule, he mainly sought to rein in opposition when
a personal victory was most essential, as in the presidential
contests of 1996 and 2000. Putin, on the other hand, is
a more cautious political actor who appears unwilling to
leave anything to chance, leading him to take greater
advantage of presidential authority to control the Russian
political environment even when he could probably win
handily even in a completely free and fair contest. Putin
also clearly beneﬁted in this regard from his background in
the KGB and FSB. Especially as he proved willing to strike
decisively against political opponents, potential political
opponents were frequently intimidated and believed that
he had both the power and will to detect and ruthlessly
suppress political opposition. Thus even where Putin
actually did nothing, there seems to have taken place
a great deal of self-censorship and self-suppression, espe-
cially in the business and media communities.
Finally, there is a strong case to be made that Putin’s
very popularity was an essential part of his success in
building Russia’s ‘‘power vertical’’ and eliminating rival
political verticals. Potential political opponents surely
understood that a challenge to Putin, who from the
moment he took presidential ofﬁce enjoyed favorability
ratingswell above 50%, was unlikely to be greeted favorably
by much of the population. This is especially true since
many of those few who actively disapproved of Putin’s job
performance were already committed to the Communists,
who were also clearly opposed by a majority of the pop-
ulation ever since the late 1990s. This, combined with the
observed failure of opposition attempts from both left and
right to mobilize mass support, served to disincline most
incumbent central ofﬁcials, governors, and business leaders
from getting very involved in opposition politics.
The question of what this popularity is based on is
a topic beyond the scope of this article. But sufﬁce it to say
that evidence points strongly to several factors. Most
obviously, Putin has beneﬁted in public eyes from a steadily
growing economy (Treisman, 2008). In addition, he has
created a sense of inevitability and stability about his rule
that increases people’s willingness to support him relative
to the kinds of alternatives they can conceive as realistic
(Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2006). He has also taken policy
stands that are both recognized and supported by thewider
public, including opposition to a socialist economy, and has
developed a personal style of leadership that people
generally like (Colton & Hale, 2009).
3. The central dilemma of patronal politics:
succession
Perhaps the most persistent problem for electoral
patronal systems, even those arranged in a single-pyramid
formation, is succession. So long as no succession problems
loom, such systems can be tremendously stable and endure
for years, even when crises of various kinds erupt. In the
former Soviet space, we thus see that chief patrons of
single-pyramid systems who have held contested elections
but who have also generally been seen as rulers-for-life
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Karimov, Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbaev, and Belarus’s
Aleksandr Lukashenka) have endured few serious threats
to their power after they were able to construct their
single-pyramid systems. The problem comes when elites
begin to expect that their patrons may leave ofﬁce for one
reason or other in the immediate future. This expectation
by itself, regardless of the thoroughness of monitoring and
punishment mechanisms, starts to weaken the links
between the various building blocks of the pyramid. Even
a system of repression so reﬁned as the East German
regime collapsed almost instantaneously once it became
widely believed that communist regimes were on the way
out in the Warsaw Pact countries (Olson, 1990). The
expectation matters is because the leader him- or herself, if
he or she does leave ofﬁce, is no longer in as good a position
as before to punish those who ‘‘defect’’ to an alternative
pyramid project. When people expect this to happen,
therefore, they calculate that the chance of escaping
punishment for defection rises and that the costs of
defection decline – even before the leader actually departs.
The odds of defection being successful rise when the
incumbent or designated successors are unpopular because
an opposition attempt immediately begins with the
powerful resource of public opinion that can be used to
mobilize street protests or make election falsiﬁcation
attempts harder to pull off. It is for this reason that each of
the post-Soviet color revolutions took place at a speciﬁc
point in time: After an incumbent president in a single-
pyramid regime had announced plans to leave ofﬁce and
after that president’s team was believed to have tried to
falsify election results that would somehow inﬂuence the
succession.16 In short, moments of succession can create
strong centrifugal pressures in electoral patronal systems,
even those organized as a single dominant pyramid that
ordinarily appears quite stable.
The dramatic developments accompanying Russia’s
succession process of 2008 make a great deal of sense in
this light. The preceding paragraph can be summarized in
the proposition that single pyramids are most likely to
break up during a leadership transition when the incum-
bent is (a) unpopular and (b) not expected to be in a posi-
tion to punish defectors after the election. Putin’s
maneuvers leading up to 2007–2008 addressed precisely
these two vulnerabilities. First, the great attention that the
regime has paid to sustaining popularity (including
everything from advertising the four National Priority
Projects to tightly controlling how political events were
portrayed on television) helped ensure that an opposition
challenge would fail even if the political machine’s system
of monitoring and punishment actually broke down.
Putin’s broad support in the population created the
impression among both elites and masses that whoever he
supported in any election would win. Moreover, this
popular support resource could conceivably be used by16 That is, Akaev and Shevardnadze were in their ﬁnal constitutional
terms and had announced that they would abide by them, and Kuchma
had declined to run for reelection despite having the opportunity to do
so. See Hale (2005).Putin even if he completely left ofﬁce, since he always could
announce a return to politics and presumably defeat
a leader who had defected from his preferred course.
Putin’s decision to lead United Russia’s party list in the
2007 Duma elections, therefore, can be seen as an attempt
to simultaneously maximize United Russia’s vote tally,
thereby ushering a maximally large delegation into the
Duma, and to demonstrate his electoral strength even
outside the presidential election arena and even as his
second term ended so as to intimidate would-be chal-
lengers. The great (and strikingly successful) effort to
associate Medvedev tightly with ‘‘Putin’s plan’’ also served
to reassure both elites and masses that not much would
change with the shift from Putin to Medvedev in the
presidency.
Putin’s decision to transfer to the post of Prime Minister
seems strongly aimed at addressing problem (b). By
announcing that he was not planning to leave politics, and
moreover that he would remain in a top post with a great
deal of power to monitor and punish defectors, he further
countered the centrifugal pressures of the succession
process. The decisions to become Prime Minister and to
head the United Russia party list (and even to chair the
party) were mutually reinforcing. While the president
appoints the prime minister according to the Russian
Constitution, the Duma must approve this appointment.
And since United Russia achieved a two-thirds majority in
the Duma thanks to Putin, few observers expected that this
Dumawould ever accept anyone other than Putin for Prime
Minister unless Putin himself asked them to. Thus Putin’s
new post is probably best described not just as Prime
Minister, which is a post highly vulnerable in Russian high
politics, but as something like ‘‘PALORP’’ (Premier And
Leader Of the Ruling Party), a post that has a great deal of
authority to resist presidential initiatives but that has
existed in post-Soviet Russian history only once, starting in
May 2008. And, of course, Putin brings to this new position
the considerable informal authority that he accumulated as
president.
Of course, this shift from a patronal presidential system
to one where the single pyramid is led by both a president
and a palorp potentially creates problems of its own. Today,
Putin and new President Dmitry Medvedev seem to be
largely on the same page, if sometimes appearing either to
differ on some tactical questions or to play a kind of good-
cop/bad-cop strategy. But in principle, if they ever diverge
on a signiﬁcant issue, both sides have considerable power
to struggle against the other. If Putin is indeed determined
to eventually leave active politics, if his strategy has all
along been to usher Medvedev into his new role as Presi-
dent and defend him from the centrifugal pressures of
succession before retiring, then the system is likely to
remain quite stable until the next moment of succession
nears. But if Putin is merely seeking a new power
arrangement for himself for some reason, then the tensions
have a good chance of coming to the foreground at some
point in the future since Medvedev may not always remain
happy in the role of sidekick when he has the formally
superior state post. If that happens, wemaywell start to see
open president–palorp competition, and if neither side is
capable of decisive victory, political contestation might
H.E. Hale / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 33–4140become more than a passing phenomenon. This brings to
mind an old conclusion of classic social science research:
Democratization may not require actual democrats.
Instead, it often results when political stalemate, and the
fear of being annihilated by their rivals should they lose,
drives leaders to create the kind of political guarantees and
competition that over time generates democracy (Rustow,
1970).
One factor that can counteract centrifugal forces to
some degree, social science research has widely docu-
mented, is the presence of an immediate foreign threat. For
this reason, the events in Georgia of 2008 have been fairly
convenient from the point of view of dampening internal
tensions within Russia’s political system during a delicate
time of transition and new regime consolidation, just as
these same tensions also worked to Mikheil Saakashvili’s
domestic political advantage as the patron in a similarly
single-pyramid regime in Georgia.17 Such foreign relations,
so long as they endure, may indeed stave off any democ-
ratizing impulse that intra-elite tensions generated by
Russia’s new ‘‘tandemocracy’’ (or ‘‘two-tipped pyramid’’)
would otherwise bring.184. Conclusion
Russia’s political system can be fruitfully understood as
an electoral patronal regime in which the most important
actors are organized into a single pyramid of authority that
dominates the electoral arena. This political machine was
not built from scratch by Putin, but was skillfully consoli-
dated using certain premade components that Yeltsin had
given him upon transferring the reins of presidential
power. But while the regional political machines, the
superpresidential constitution, and the oligarchic corporate
conglomerates were only loosely cobbled together under
Yeltsin, and even then only mobilized fully during certain
crucial moments such as the election cycles of 1995–1996
and 1999–2000, Putin fused these elements into a highly
coordinated whole, a gigantic political machine with great
staying power, surviving even the presidential succession
of 2008.
Russia represents a certain pattern for electoral patronal
regimes that is relatively common to Eurasia, a pattern
characterized by strong and tough leadership tactics and
regime popularity, a situation probably most closely
approximated in 2009 by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. The development of power pyramids in
Georgia and Kyrgyzstanwas interrupted by their respective
color revolutions, episodes of competing-pyramid politics
brought on partly by succession crises, but single-pyramid
systems have effectively reemerged there too as of 2009.19
Other than the Baltic countries, only Moldova and post-
Orange Revolution Ukraine, with stronger parliaments than17 For example, he frequently sought to discredit his domestic opposi-
tion as being witting or unwitting agents of Russian policy.
18 Theterm ‘‘tandemocracy’’ comesfromKommersant-Vlast,March10,2008.
19 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report, for example, rated both
countries less democratic in 2009 than they were right before their color
revolutions: Goehring (2008).the rest, have sustained something closer to competing-
pyramid politics, with its characteristic openness.
This analysis, therefore, demonstrates that the logic of
hybrid regimes and clientelist politics can be useful in
understanding political developments in Eurasia. That is,
the development of Russia’s political system (as well those
of other countries of Eurasia) can be more fruitfully
understood as the development of a particular type of
hybrid regime than as the functioning of (or the movement
toward) either democracy or autocracy. And because hybrid
regimes are so common worldwide but so under-
conceptualized and poorly understood, specialists in the
Eurasian area who are oriented to the development of
comparative political science theory will likely have a lot to
offer world social science in the years to come.References
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